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Although there is a broad literature on structural credit risk models, there
has been little empirical testing of these models. In this paper we examine the
term structure of credit spreads on euro corporate bonds and the empirical
validation of structural credit risk models. The latter provide a framework
to analyze the main determinents of credit spreads. Using a dataset of 1577
investment grade corporate and 250 AAA rated government bonds, we ﬁrst
estimate the term structure of credit spreads for diﬀerent (sub)rating cate-
gories with an extension of the Nelson-Siegel method. Within each rating
category, credit spreads on plus rated bonds have signiﬁcantly higher credit
spreads than minus rated bonds. According to the structural models, the
results indicate that credit spread changes are signiﬁcantly negatively corre-
lated with changes in the level and the slope of the default-free term structure.
While changes in the slope aﬀect all rating categories, changes in the level are
more important for higher rated bonds (AAA and AA). The stock return and
the implied volatility of the stock price seem to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence credit
spread changes. The lower the rating category and the longer the maturity
of the bond the stronger both eﬀects. For BBB rated bonds, changes in liq-
uidity -measured as the bid-ask spread- signiﬁcantly inﬂuence credit spread
changes. Higher rated bonds (AAA and AA) are also driven by past credit
spread changes.
JEL: C22, E45, G15
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From 1998 onwards, the euro corporate bond market has become wider and more
liquid. The number of corporate bonds has doubled over the last ﬁve years from
just over 500 to around 1100. The development of the A and BBB rated market
segment has been particularly impressive, coming from virtual non-existence in
early 1998, to account for almost half the individual rated bond issues outstanding
in late 2002. This evolution has reinforced the need to study the markets of default-
risky instruments such as corporate bonds. In the past few years, credit derivatives
were the fastest growing derivative products. They provide a convenient tool to
control for credit risk exposure. In order to accurately price credit derivatives a
good understanding of the determinants of the underlying yields and credit spreads
is necessary. Furthermore, the changing regulatory framework, more speciﬁcally the
Basle II Accord has even enhanced the focus on modeling default-risky instruments.
Credit risk models can be used as a basis for calculating a banks’ regulatory capital.
As a response to the request of information by investors and regulators and to the
internal risk monitoring, (central) banks and ﬁrms invest heavily in systems to
measure credit risk and to understand the behavior of default-risky instruments.
Banks have developed credit risk models in an attempt to quantify and manage
risk across geographical and product lines. Firms want to price credit exposure and
develop a system of internal capital allocation. For a central bank, it is important
to analyze the link between corporate bonds and money markets to understand the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Furthermore, as a leading indicator,
credit spreads might be a useful indicator for monetary policy.
Many studies concentrate on the pricing of corporate bonds and theoretical mod-
els for credit risk. However, there has been little empirical testing of these models.
As the US has a large and mature corporate bond market, most empirical studies
on corporate credit spreads concentrate on US data (Duﬀee (1998), Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001) and others). Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) relate
US credit spread changes to common and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. They conclude that
proxies that should measure changes in default probability and recovery rate, as
suggested by traditional models, explain only about one quarter of the variation
of credit spreads. Duﬀee (1998) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative correlation between on
the one hand credit spread changes and on the other hand the level and the slope
of the default-free term structure. Changes in the level and the slope appear to
have a much stronger eﬀect on callable (compared to noncallable) bonds and on
lower (compared to higher) rated bonds. Cossin & Hricko (2001) investigate the
main factors driving a cross-section of credit default swap rates. They conclude
that the rating category is the most important source of information. Besides, the
level and the slope of the yield curve, leverage and the stock price seem to have
as i g n i ﬁcant inﬂuence. Empirical studies on the determinants of European credit
spreads is rather limited. Annaert & De Ceuster (2000) analyze credit spreads on
eurobonds for diﬀerent rating categories and time to maturity buckets. They ﬁnd
a negative correlation between credit spreads changes and changes in the level and
2t h es l o p eo ft h ed e f a u l t - f r e et e r ms t r u c t u r e .
The main contribution of this paper is that we analyze the term structure of
credit spreads on euro corporate bonds. Up till now, most studies on the euro
corporate bond market concentrate on the time series properties of bond indices.
In this paper however we use individual data to estimate the term structure. We
then empirically investigate the main factors driving credit spread changes for dif-
ferent types of bonds based on (sub)rating categories and time to maturity. The
structural models, initiated by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), provide
a theoretical framework to determine the main factors, namely the level and the
slope of the default-free term structure, the stock return and the implied volatil-
ity of stock price. Furthermore, we also take into account diﬀerences in liquidity,
measured as the bid-ask spread. We use a data set of 1577 individual corporate
bonds and 250 government bonds from January 1998 until December 2002 included
in the Merrill Lynch Broad Market indices. On a weekly basis, we extract the term
s t r u c t u r eo fs p o tr a t e sf o rd i ﬀerent (sub)rating categories using an extension of the
Nelson-Siegel model. We add four additional factors to the original Nelson-Siegel
model that should capture diﬀerences in liquidity, taxation and subrating categories.
Credit spreads are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the spot rates on corporate and
government bonds.
A ﬁrst analysis of the term structure shows that the changes in the level and
the slope of the default-free term structure are two important determinants. While
changes in the slope aﬀect all rating categories, changes in the level mainly aﬀect the
higher rating categories, namely AAA and AA rated bonds. The stock return and
the implied volatility of the stock price seem to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence credit spread
changes. The lower the rating category and the longer the maturity of the bond the
stronger both eﬀects. For BBB rated bonds, changes in liquidity - measured as the
average bid-ask spread - are an important determinant. Higher rated bonds (AAA
and AA) are also driven by past credit spread changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main determinants
of credit spreads according to structural credit risk models. Section 3 gives an
overview of the methodology to extract spot rates (Extended Nelson-Siegel model)
and four measures of ﬁt. In Section 4, we ﬁrst present the data and the estimation
results of the term structure of credit spreads. Then, we empirically analyze the
main determinants of credit spread changes for diﬀerent (sub)rating categories and
years to maturity. Eventually, Section 5 concludes.
2 Determinants of Credit Spreads
The default risk of a bond is the possibility that the bondholder does not receive
(in full) the payments stated in the contract, such as principal amount and interest
payments. Credit risk is a more general concept, it is the risk associated with any
kind of credit-linked events: changes in credit quality which also includes down-
grading or upgrading in rating, changes in credit spreads, and the default event
(see, for example, Bielecki & Rutkowski (2002)). Credit pricing approaches can
3usually be divided in two categories: (1) structural or contingent-claim models and
(2) reduced-form models. The former type relates the credit event to the ﬁrm’s
value and the ﬁrm’s capital structure. Therefore, these models are also called ﬁrm-
value models. The reduced-form models do not attempt to model the asset value
and the capital structure of the ﬁrm. Instead they specify the credit event as an
unpredictable event governed by a hazard-rate process. These models are more
tractable mathematically and therefore more suitable for credit derivatives pricing.
For the purpose of this paper, however, we will concentrate on the structural mod-
els.1 They provide an intuitive framework to determine the main factors that drive
credit spreads changes.
In the structural models, initiated by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974),
default occurs when at the maturity T the ﬁrm’s asset value, VA,T, falls below a
speciﬁed critical value. In the Merton model (1974), the critical value is given by
the face value of the ﬁrms zerobond debt, L, which is by assumption the only source
of debt. In case of default, debt holders receive the amount VA,T.T h ev a l u eo fa
defaultable zero-coupon bond at time T can be written as
D(T)=m i n ( L,VA,T)=L − max(0,L− VA,T)( 1 )
The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond is thus equal to the diﬀerence of
the value of a default-free zero-coupon bond with face value L and the value of
European put option written on the ﬁrm’s assets, with strike price L and exercise
date T.2 The payoﬀ, L − VA,T, is often called the put-to-default.S i n c eVA,T is the
sum of the ﬁrm’s debt and equity, the value of the equity at time T equals
E(VT)=VA,T − min(VA,T,L)=m a x ( 0 ,V A,T − L)=C(T)
The ﬁrm’s equity can thus be seen as the value of a call option on the ﬁrm’s
assets. Issuing debt is similar to selling the ﬁrm’s assets to the bond holders while
the equity holders keep a call option to buy back the assets. Using the put-call
parity, this is equivalent to saying that the equity holders own the ﬁrm’s assets and
buy a put option from the bond holders.
Merton (1974) derived a closed-form solution for the price of a defaultable zero-
coupon bond by combining equation (1) with the Black and Scholes formula for
the arbitrage price of a European put option. Having an analytical expression for
the price of a defaultable bond, we can deduce the related credit spread (S)o na
defaultable bond
S(t,T)=−
ln(Φ (h2)+1 /lexp(−κ(T − t)) Φ(−h1))
T − t
(2)
1In practice, the ﬁrm value is typically not observable. This makes it diﬃcult to specify and
estimate an empirically valid process for the ﬁrm value. Furthermore, as a ﬁrm’s capital structure
is often quite complicated, these models may quickly become too complex to analyze in practice
(Jones et al. (1984)).
2The bond holder has written a put option from the equity holders, agreeing to accept the
assets in settlement of the payment if the value of the ﬁrm falls below the face value of the debt.
4with
h1,2(Γ,T− t)=
−ln(l) − κ(T − t) ± 0.5 σ2











where Φ denotes the cumulative probability distribution function of a standard
normal.3 κ is the payout ratio, Lt = LB(t,T) is the present value of the promised
claim (the face value) at the maturity of the bond (T)a n dB(t,T)r e p r e s e n t st h e
value of a unit default-free zero-coupon bond. l is the leverage ratio, r the contin-
uously compounded risk-free rate and σV the volatility of the ﬁrm assets value.
The Merton credit risk model for zero-coupon bonds has been extended in several
ways by relaxing some restrictive assumptions. Geske (1977), for example derives
closed-form solutions for risky coupon bonds. Black & Cox (1976) introduced the
so-called ﬁrst passage time models, which allow for bankruptcy before maturity of
the bond. They extend the model with safety covenants that allow bondholders
to force bankruptcy if certain conditions are satisﬁed. Cox et al. (1980) apply the
Merton model to credit-risky debt with a variable interest rate to identify vari-
able coupon payout structures that eliminate or reduce interest rate risk. Turnbull
(1979) extends the model to an economy with both corporate tax and bankruptcy
costs. Leland (1994, 1998) and Leland & Toft (1996) analyze corporate debt in the
context of optimal capital structure. These studies conclude that in the presence of
bankruptcy costs and strategic debt service, credit spreads are signiﬁcantly higher.
Longstaﬀ & Schwartz (1995) further adapt the Black and Cox model by allowing
interest rates to be stochastic. Furthermore, they do not require the recovery to
be equal to the boundary value upon ﬁrst passage but assume that the recovery is
exogenously given. Although the Merton model has been extended in several ways,
some factors such as the leverage ratio, the risk-free rate and the volatility of the
ﬁrm’s assets value.are common to most of the structural models.
The following macroeconomic and ﬁnancial factors, which are discussed in more
detail below, are included in the empirical analysis: the risk-free interest rate, the
slope of the default-free term structure, the stock return, the implied volatility of
the stock price and a measure of diﬀerences in liquidity (the bid-ask spread). Except
for the liquidity proxy, the choice of the factors is justiﬁed by the existing literature
on structural credit risk models,
2.1 Risk-free interest rate
According to the structural models, an increase in the risk-free rate implies a smaller


















5discount rate of the expected cash ﬂows of the option at maturity. As such, the
interest rate can have an indirect eﬀect on credit spreads. An increase of the interest
rate reduces the present value of the cash ﬂows or the price of the option. This eﬀect
implies a lower credit spread. Furthermore, the drift of the risk-neutral process in a
Merton setup, which is the expected growth of the ﬁrm’s value, equals the risk-free
interest rate. An increase of the interest rate implies an increase of the expected
growth rate of the ﬁrm value. This will in turn lower the price of the put option and
the credit spread. Longstaﬀ & Schwartz (1995)and Duﬀee (1998) ﬁnd a negative
correlation between changes in the three month Treasury bill rate and credit spreads
changes on US investment-grade corporate bonds.
2.2 The slope of the term structure
As documented in Litterman & Scheinkman (1991) and Chen & Scott (1993), the
vast majority of variation in the term structure can be expressed by changes in the
level and the slope. Therefore, we also include changes in the slope of the default-free
term structure. An increase in the slope implies an increase in the expected short-
term interest rates. Similar to the motivation for the risk-free interest rate above,
an increase in the slope is expected to lower the price of the put option and reduce
a ﬁrm’s default risk. Furthermore, the slope of the term structure is often related
to future business cycle conditions. A decrease in the slope is considered to be an
indicator of a weakening economy. Estrella & Hardouvelis (1991) conclude that
a positively sloped yield curve is associat e dw i t ha ni m p r o v i n ge c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y ,
measured by consumption, consumer durables and investment. Improving economy
growth might in turn increase the growth rate of the ﬁrm value and reduce the
default risk. Therefore, we expect a negative correlation between changes in the
slope of the default-free term structure and the credit spread changes.
2.3 Stock price
Equation (2) includes the distance to default or the pseudo asset-to-debt ratio. The
lower the distance to default, the higher the probability of default. According to
the structural models, a ﬁrm defaults when the distance to default becomes one.
An increase in the face value of a ﬁrms’ debt (or a decrease in the value of the
equity given a ﬁxed asset value) increases the distance to default and the value of
the put option. Structural models typically assume that the assets of the ﬁrm is a
tradable security. In practice, however, the value of the assets is usually replaced
by the value of the equity. A fall in a ﬁrm’s stock price may increase the value of
the put option as well as the credit spread. Ramaswami (1991) and Shane (1994)
ﬁnd that noninvestment grade bonds are correlated with equity returns. Kwan
(1996) analyses the relation between individual stock returns and yield changes of
individual bonds issued by the same ﬁrm. The author concludes that stocks lead
bonds in ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Lagged stock returns have explanatory power for
current bond yield changes, while current stock returns are unrelated to lagged bond
yield changes. Furthermore, the return on an equity index gives an indication of the
6business climate. Chen (1991), Fama & French (1989), Friedman & Kuttner (1992)
and Guha & Hiris (2002) conclude that credit spreads behave counter-cyclically
i.e. credit spreads tend to increase during recessions and narrow during expansions.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) include the S&P500 return to proxy for the overall
state of the economy and ﬁnd a negative correlation with credit spread changes.
Although we use individual bonds to extract spot rates for diﬀerent (sub)rating
categories, the estimated term structure is equal for all bonds in that risk class.
Therefore, we use the return on market index as a possible determinant of credit
spread changes instead of individual debt or stock returns (see 5.1). To test the
hypothesis that stocks lead bonds, we include a one-period lag of the return. We
expect a negative correlation between credit spread changes and the lagged return.
2.4 Implied Volatility
Equation (2) shows that credit spreads are aﬀected by changes in the volatility of
the ﬁrm assets value. The higher the volatility the more likely that the value of
the ﬁrm falls below the value of the debt or the more likely the put option will be
exercised. This will widen credit spreads. Ronn & Verma (1986) and Jones et al.
(1984) link the volatility of the ﬁrm value to the volatility of the stock price. As
pointed out before, the equity of a ﬁr mc a nb er e p r e s e n t e da sac a l lo p t i o no nt h e
value of the assets of the ﬁrm with a maturity similar to the ﬁrm’s debt and a strike
price similar to the maturity value of the debt. A ﬁrm with a higher equity volatility
is more likely to hit the boundary condition for default. An increase in the volatility
of the stock price reduces the expected payoﬀ and hence increases credit spreads.
Campbell & Taksler (2002) ﬁnd that equity variation explains as much variation in
corporate credit spreads as do credit ratings.
Changes in the future volatility of the stock price can be extracted from the
implied volatility of publicly traded options of the ﬁrm. This data is, however,
not available for most bonds in the sample. Furthermore, we estimate the term
structure of credit spreads for a group of bonds. Therefore, we use the implied
volatility on a market index instead of the individual stock prices. .
2.5 Measure of Liquidity
Option models typically used in the structural approach assume perfect and com-
plete markets where trading take places continuously. These assumptions imply
no diﬀerences in liquidity between bonds. However, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)
ﬁnd that credit spread changes are signiﬁcantly eﬀected by measures of liquidity
changes: (1) the diﬀerence between the on- and oﬀ-the-run Treasury yields and (2)
the diﬀerence between the 10-year swap yield and the 10-year Treasury yield. Elton
et al. (2001) conclude that besides taxation, recovery rate and bond age, liquidity
is an important factor inﬂuencing bond pricing. Houweling et al. (2002) ﬁnd a yield
premium between liquid and illiquid euro-denominated bonds from 0.2 to 47 basis
points depending on the liquidity indicator. Although we attempt to remove illiquid
7bonds, the credit spreads might still be inﬂuenced by changes in liquidity.4 As in
Amihud & Mendelson (1986, 1991) and Chakravarty & Sarkar (1999), we use the
bid-ask spread as a measure for illiquidity. The quoted ask price includes a pre-
mium for the immediate buying, while the quoted bid price reﬂects a concession for
immediate sale (Amihud & Mendelson (1986)). Since illiquidity can be measured by
the cost of immediate execution, the bid-ask is natural measure of illiquidity. Nar-
rowing bid-ask spreads indicate greater liquidity. We expect a positive relationship
between changes in the average bid-ask spread and credit spread changes.
3 Modeling the Term Structure of Credit Spreads
A large part of the literature deals with the term structure of credit spreads (Sarig
& Warga (1989), Fons (1994), Jarrow et al. (1997) and others). The idea is that
spreads on corporate bonds depends on the time to maturity. Fons (1994) ﬁnds
that for investment grade bonds marginal default probabilities and credit spreads
increase as the time horizon lengthens but decrease for speculative grade bonds.
This implies an increasing term structure of credit spreads for investment grade
bonds and a decreasing term structure for speculative grade. To explain this phe-
nomenon, the author suggests an underlying mean reversion in company credit
outlooks. For highly rated bonds there are only two possibilities, or stable ratings
or declining ratings. A lower rated ﬁrm may face a higher probability of default
in the short term. Over the long run, low-rated ﬁrms that survived the ﬁrst few
years tend to evolve to the middle ratings, top-rated ﬁrms tend to decrease to the
middle ratings and the middle rating tend to stay in that category. This implies a
mean-reversion of ratings as well as credit spreads. In this paper, we concentrate on
the investment grade bonds (AAA, AA, A and BBB rating) and therefore expect to
ﬁnd an increasing term structure. To estimate the term structure of credit spreads
we use an extension of the Nelson-Siegel model, which will be discussed in more
detail below.
3.1 Extended Nelson-Siegel Approach
The term structure of credit spreads is calculated as the diﬀerence between the term
structure of spot rates on corporate and government bonds. There are a few reasons
for using the spot rates instead of yields to maturity. The yield to maturity depends
on the coupon rate. The yield to maturity of bonds with the same maturity but
diﬀerent coupons may vary considerably. As such, the credit spread will depend
on the coupon rate. Furthermore, if we use yields to maturity to calculate the
credit spread, we compare bonds with diﬀerent duration and convexity. On the
other hand, spot rates are not observable. Therefore, we use an extension of the
parametric model introduced by Nelson & Siegel (1987) to extract the spot rates for
diﬀerent rating categories (AAA, AA, A and BBB). This Nelson-Siegel (NS) model
4We attempt to remove illiquid bonds by excluding bonds that have on average less than one
price quote a week.
8oﬀers a conceptually simple and parsimonious description of the term structure
of interest rates. It avoids over-parametrization while it allows for monotonically
increasing or decreasing yield curves and hump shaped yield curves. Diebold & Li
(2002) conclude that the NS method produces one-year-ahead forecasts that are
strikingly more accurate than standard benchmarks. Furthermore, it avoids the
problem in spline-based models to choose the best knot point speciﬁcation.5
T h ei d e ao ft h eN Sm e t h o di st oﬁt the empirical form of the yield curve with a
pre-speciﬁed functional form for the spot rates, which is a function of the time to
maturity of the bonds.
it,j(m,θ)=β0 + β1
1−exp(−mt /τ1)
(−mt /τ1) + β2
³
1−exp(−mt /τ1)









it denotes the spot rates at time t, j = {AAA, AA, A and BBB},mis the time
to maturity of the bonds and θ =( β0,β1,β2,τ1) is the vector of parameters. β0
represents the long-run level of interest rates, β1 the short-run component and β2
the medium-term component. If the time to maturity goes to inﬁnity, the spot rate
converges to βo. I ft h et i m et om a t u r i t yg e t st oz e r o ,t h es p o tr a t ec o n v e r g e st o
β0 + β1. To avoid negative interest rates, β0 and β0 + β1 should be positive. β0
can be interpreted as the long-run interest rate and βo + β1 as the instantaneous
interest rate. This implies that −β1 can be interpreted as the slope of the yield
curve. The curve will have a negative slope if β1 is positive and vice versa. β1 also
indicates the speed with which the curve evolves towards its long-run trend (Bolder
& Streliski (1999)). β2 determines the magnitude and the direction of the hump
or through in the yield curve. The parameter τ1 is a time constant that should be
positive in order to assure convergence to the long-term value β0. This parameter
speciﬁe st h ep o s i t i o no ft h eh u m po rt h r o u g ho nt h ey i e l dc u r v e . 6
However, in accordance with Elton et al. (2001), we ﬁnd that the NS method
results in systematic errors that are a function of liquidity, the coupon rate and
subcategories within a rating category (plus, ﬂat and minus rating). Therefore,
we extend the original NS model with four additional factors. First, to capture
diﬀerences in liquidity within a rating category, we add the bid-ask spread as an
additional factor (Liq). If liquidity decreases, bid-ask spreads and hence spot rates
might go up. Second, to capture part of the taxation eﬀect, we include the dif-
ference between the coupon of a bond and the average coupon rate in a rating
5For comparison with other methods, see Green & Odegaard (1997)
6Svensson (1994) extended the NS model with an additional exponential term that allows for a
second possible hump or through. However, Geyer & Mader (1999) ﬁnd that the Svensson method
does not perform better in the form of smaller yield errors in the objective function compared to
the NS method. Furthermore, Bolder & Streliski (1999) conclude that the Svensson model requires





. The underlying idea is that low coupon bonds are tax advan-
taged compared to high coupon bonds. Finally, another reason why bonds might
have diﬀerent yields within a rating category is that they are not viewed as equally
risky. Moody’s and Standard and Poors both introduced subcategories within a
rating category. Bonds that are rated with a plus or a minus might be considered
a sh a v i n gad i ﬀerent probability of default compared to the ﬂat letter rating. There-
fore, we include a dummy for the plus subcategory (Dum pl) and a dummy for the
minus subcategory (Dum mi). For simplicity, we assume that the additional factors
may only aﬀect the level of the term structure and not the slope. The following
extended version of the NS model is estimated
it,j(m,e θ)=βo + β1
1−exp(−mt /τ1)
(−mt /τ1) + β2
³
1−exp(−mt /τ1)
(−mt /τ1) − exp(−mt /τ1)
´







βo,β1,β2,τ1 represent the parameters in the original NS model while β3, β4,
β5 and β6 represent the sensitivities of the spot rates to the additional factors.
Every set of parameters (e θ)t r a n s l a t e si nd i ﬀerent spot rates and bond prices.
Therefore, we estimate the parameters ass u c ha st om i n i m i z et h es u mo fs q u a r e d
errors between the estimated and observed yields to maturity that belong to speciﬁc
rating category j at time t.7








We apply maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters on a weekly basis for
AAA rated government bonds and diﬀerent types of corporate bonds. This allows
us to estimate the term structure of credit spreads for diﬀerent types of bonds.
3.2 Goodness of Fit Statistics
In order to compare the extension with the original NS method and to test how well
the (extended) NS model describes the underlying data, we estimate three in-sample
measures: (1) the average absolute yield errors (AAEyield), (2) the percentage of
bonds that have a yield outside a 95% conﬁdence interval (hit ratio)a n d( 3 )t h e
conditional and unconditional frequency of pricing errors. Finally, we examine the
7Alternatively, bond prices could be approximated and price errors could be minimized. Deacon
& Derry (1994), however, ﬁnd that minimizing yields improves the ﬁt of the yield curve because
greater weight is given to bonds with maturities up to about ten years.
10out-of-sample forecasting performance. For each measure, we compare the results
of the NS model with those of the extended NS model.











yi,t and b yi,t are the observed and estimated yields to maturity at time t in rat-
ing category i. n is the number of bonds at time t. The higher the AAEyield,t
t h el e s sg o o dt h eq u a l i t yo ft h eﬁt.
2. The second measure is the percentage of bonds that have an observed yield
to maturity outside a 95% conﬁdence interval around the estimated term
structure of yields to maturity. We use the delta method and the maximum
likelihood results to obtain a 95% conﬁdence interval for the term structure














ϑθ where Σ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of
the estimated parameters b θ. f(b θ) denote the estimated yields to maturity
according to the (extended) NS method.
3. As a third measure, we report the conditional frequency of pricing errors. We
examine the pricing errors of individual bonds at time t and classify them in
three categories: positive, zero or negative. Errors are assumed to be zero
if the absolute value of the yield error is below the bid-ask spread. We then
look at pricing errors of these bonds at time t + 1 and report the changes
(transition matrix). If pricing errors are white noise, there should be no clear
pattern in the transition matrices. Bliss (1997) and Diebold & Li (2002) ﬁnd
that regardless of the term structure estimation method, there is a persistent
diﬀerence between estimated and actual bond prices.
4. The previous measures are in-sample goodness of ﬁt measures. Bliss (1997),
however, concludes that in-sample results may give a distorted view of a
method’s performance. Therefore, we also examine the out-of-sample fore-
casting performance. First, we estimate the vector of parameters θ at time t.
Then, we use b θt to estimate the term structure of the yields to maturity at
time t+k. e yt+k = f(m, b θt) are the forecasts of the yields to maturity at time
t + k,w i t hk = {1,2,4}. We estimate the AAEyield for the forecasted yields
resulting from the (extended) NS model.
114 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data Description
The analysis uses individual bond data of the EMU Broad Market indices from
January, 1 1998 until December, 30 2002 constructed by Merrill Lynch. The EMU
Broad Market indices are based on secondary market prices of bonds issued in
the eurobond market or in EMU-zone domestic markets and denominated in euro
or one of the currencies that joined the EMU. Besides bond prices, the dataset
contains data on the coupon rate, the time to maturity, the rating, the industry
classiﬁcation, and the amount issued. Ratings are composite Moody’s and Standard
& Poors ratings. The Merrill Lynch Broad Market index covers investment-grade
ﬁrms. Hence the analysis is restricted to corporate bonds rated BBB and higher.
Further, all bonds have a ﬁxed rate coupon and pay annual coupons. To be included
in the Merrill Lynch index, bonds should have a minimum size of 100 million euro for
corporate bonds and 1 billion euro for government bonds. Because the EMU Broad
Market index has rather low minimum size requirements, it provides a relatively
broad coverage of the underlying markets.
Several ﬁlters are imposed to construct the sample of defaultable corporate
bonds. First, we exclude bonds for which there is no rating available. Second,
in order to have a sample of liquid bonds, we exclude all bonds which have less than
one price quote a week on average. Third, to ensure that we consider bonds backed
solely by the creditworthiness of the issuer, we eliminate such bonds as asset-backed
securities. For consistency, only regulated bonds are considered. Fourth, as in Duf-
fee (1999), we only use bonds with at least one year remaining to maturity. Finally,
we eliminate bonds that have a price that is out of line with surrounding prices
(pricing errors). These ﬁlters leave us with a data set of 1577 corporate bonds
issued by 448 ﬁrms. Concerning government bonds, if a country issued two bonds
in one month, we exclude the bond that has less price quotes. We have 250 AAA
rated government bonds.8
The credit rating is the most widely observed measure of credit quality. We
make a distinction between four rating categories: AAA, AA, A and BBB. From
the 1577 corporate bonds that enter the Merrill Lynch index between January 1998
and December 2002, 408 bonds have an AAA rating, 509 an AA rating, 484 an
A rating and 176 a BBB rating. If a bond is downgraded to a speculative grade
rating (below BBB) or matured, it is removed from the index. Graph 1 shows the
number of bonds in each rating category over the sample period. While the number
of AAA and AA rated bonds has been stable over the sample period, the number
of A and BBB rated bonds has increased enormously. Between January 1998 and
April 2000, the Merrill Lynch includes less than 50 BBB rated bonds on average.
Moreover, less than half of the BBB rated bonds included are quoted during that
period. Graph 2 presents, for each rating category, the number of bonds that are
8The sample of 250 AAA bonds consists of 114 German, 58 Austrian, 55 French, 37 Dutch, 8
Irish, 4 Spanish and 3 Finish bonds.
12not quoted in percentage of the total number of bonds in that rating category. If a
higher trading frequency reﬂects more liquidity, this graph gives a rough indication
of liquidity. It seems that for BBB rated bonds, less than 50% of the bonds were
quoted on a weekly basis from January 1998 until January 2000. From June 2000,
the indicator sharply decreases below 20% and converges to a level comparable to
higher rated bonds.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the average number of corporate bonds in maturity
buckets of 2 or 3 years and for diﬀerent rating categories. The number of AAA rate
bonds decreases with the time to maturity. For AA and A rated bonds the number
of bonds is equally spread over the maturities. On average, there are less bonds in
the BBB rating category compared to the other ratings. Furthermore, no BBB has
a maturity beyond ten years to maturity. Panel B of Table 1 presents the average
number of bonds based on rating category and sector. We make a distinction
between bonds issued in the ﬁnancial, industrial and utilities sector.9 Panel C
shows that the majority of the AAA and AA rated bonds are ﬁnancials, 96% and
81% respectively, whereas the majority of the BBB rated bonds are industrials,
84%. A rated bonds are a mixture of ﬁnancials and industrials, 54% and 39%
respectively. Since the utilities represent only a small group in each rating category,
we do separately analyze them.
Panel A of Table 2 contains information on the time to maturity of the corporate
bonds and the number of weeks that a bond is quoted. For each bond, we calculate
three statistics (mean, minimum and maximum) of the time to maturity. Then, we
calculate the mean of the means, the minimum of the minima and the maximum
of the maxima for each rating category. The minimum years to maturity (of the
minima) is one and that the maximum (of the maxima) varies between 10 for BBB
rated bonds and almost 22 for A rated bonds.10 Although higher rated bonds have
a higher time to maturity, the number of bonds beyond 10 years to maturity is
limited. The average number of weeks that a bond is included in the index is 145
weeks.
4.1.1 Probability of Rating Transition
If a bond is downgraded, it will be perceived as riskier by the market. This may
result in a decrease in bond value. Thus, even if no default occurs, a downgrading
might inﬂuence the value of a bond. Panel B of Table 2 presents the average yearly
ratings transition matrix that is an average of ﬁve transition matrices from Jan.
1998 until Dec. 2002. For each rating category, panel C of Table 2 gives the
probability that a bond has the same rating or has been up- or downgraded after
one year. Each row corresponds to the initial rating and each column corresponds
to the rating after one year. The largest probabilities are on the diagonal, which
indicates that most bonds do not change rating within a period of one year. Some
9Securitized bonds, quasi & foreign government bonds and Pfandbriefe are not included in the
analysis.
10We only consider bonds that have a time to maturity of at least one year and are included in
the index for at least 12 weeks.
13probabilities are equal to zero. For BBB rated bonds, for example, the probability of
being upgraded to AAA or AA within one year is negligible. The last column gives
the probability that a bond is removed from the index although it has more then
one year to maturity.11 For example, when a bond is downgraded to speculative
grade, it is removed from the index and its rating becomes NA (Not Available).
The ﬁrst column gives the average number of bonds with an initial AAA, AA, A or
BBB rating.
Second, we estimate the time-varying probability of being upgraded or down-
graded, using a moving window of 6 months. The probability of being upgraded
is rather stable over time (not presented in the paper). The probability of be-
ing downgraded varies signiﬁcantly over time (graph 3). The probability for being
downgraded from A to BBB is especially high in 2001 and the beginning of 2002.
The probability of being downgraded from AA to A rating is around 6% in 2000.
From the second half of 2002, it sharply increased to almost 16%.
4.2 Estimating the Term Structure of Credit Spreads
4.2.1 Yield Errors of the Nelson-Siegel model






of the original NS model. Within each rating category
and on a weekly basis, we split the sample into (1) plus and minus-rated bonds,
(2) bonds with above and below average coupon rates and (3) bonds with above
and below average bid-ask spreads. For each rating category, yield errors of the
plus-rated bonds are on average positive while those of minus-rated bonds are on
average negative (see panel A of Table 3). The diﬀerence between the plus and
the minus subcategory is more pronounced for lower rated bonds. Thus, it is most
important to make a distinction for BBB. Panel B presents the t-test for equality
of means. The null hypothesis that plus and minus rated bonds have equal mean
yield errors is rejected at a 1% level. Second, bonds with above average coupon
rates seem to have higher yields compared to bonds with below average coupon
rates. Yield errors are on average negative (positive) for bonds with above (below)
average coupon rates. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected. Finally, we
make a distinction between bonds with above and below average bid-ask spreads.
Bonds with high bid-ask spreads have higher yields and thus negative yield errors.
The t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means.
To capture the simultaneous eﬀect of the factors, we regress the yield errors on
a dummy for a plus rating, a dummy for a minus rating, the bid-ask spread and the
deviation from the average coupon rate on a weekly basis.
εt,j = γ1Dum plt,j + γ2Dum mit,j + γ3Liqt,j + γ4(Ct,j − Ct,j)+ηt,j
with j = {AAA, AA, A and BBB} and (γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4) the vector of parameters.
We use weekly data from January 1998 until December 2002. Regression analysis
11Bonds are normally removes from the Merrill Lynch Broad EMU index one year before matu-
rity.
14conﬁrms the previous results, namely that yield errors are a function of the subrating
categories (plus, ﬂat or minus), liquidity and the coupon rate. Panel C of Table 3
presents the percentage of regressions (weeks) that have the expected sign and are
signiﬁcant at a 5% level. The tax eﬀect seems to be most important for higher rating
categories, namely AAA and AA. The latter eﬀect has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
94%, respectively 70%, of the regressions for AAA, respectively AA, rated bonds. As
expected, the eﬀect of the bid-ask spread is most important for BBB rated bonds.
In almost half of the regressions the bid-ask spread has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The
distinction between plus, ﬂat and minus rating seem to be an important determinant
of diﬀerences in yield errors. Bonds that are rated plus or minus are viewed as having
ad i ﬀerent risk proﬁle compared to bonds with a ﬂat rating. Splitting the group of
bonds in three subgroups would have the disadvantage of having less bonds in each
group. Therefore we will include two dummies. For BBB rated bonds we make a
distinction between on the one hand BBB plus rated bonds and on the other hand
BBB ﬂat and BBB minus rated bonds. We do not have enough BBB minus rated
bonds to make it an additional subrating category.
4.2.2 Extended Nelson-Siegel Model: Results
We have shown that additional factors besides the time to maturity can cause sys-
tematic yield errors. Therefore, we reestimate the term structure of credit spreads
using the extended NS model (see equation 4). Graph 4 to 7 present the credit
spreads on AAA, AA, A and BBB rated bonds with 3, 5, 7 and 10 years to matu-
rity. The spreads on AA, A and BBB rated bonds are a weighted average of the
spreads in the subrating categories (plus, ﬂat and minus). The weights at time t are
the number of bonds in the subrating categories in percentage of the total number
of bonds in that rating category at time t. In the case of BBB rated bonds, we only
make a distinction between two subcategories, (1) BBB plus and (2) BBB ﬂat and
minus, due to the fact that there are only few BBB minus rated bonds. Most of
the time, credit spreads are an increasing function of the time to maturity. From
January 1998 until August 1998, however, the term structure of credit spreads is
ﬂat or downward sloping. From the beginning of 2000 until the beginning of 2001,
credit spreads of all rating categories increased. This coincides with a period of
zero or negative growth rate of the OECD leading indicator for the EMU area. In
the ﬁrst quarter of 2001, credit spreads decline as investors believe that the down-
turn in growth and the rise in default rates have been priced in bond yields. After
September 11, 2001 credit spreads on AA, A and BBB rated bond sharply increase.
From January 2002, credit spreads slowly decrease to their level before September
1 1 .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h eO E C Dl e a d i n gi n d i c a t o rb e c o m ep o s -
itive, with a peak growth rate in December 2001. From mid 2002, credit spreads in
virtually all rating categories widen again. These evolutions seem to indicate that
credit spreads behave counter-cyclically, i.e. credit spreads tend to widen during
recessions and narrow during expansions.
As in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001) and Duﬀee (1998), we
ﬁnd that issuers of lower rated bonds pay a higher credit spread. Table 4 presents
15the average and the standard deviation of credit spreads in subrating categories of
bonds with 2 to 10 years to maturity. Bonds with an AA plus rating have a credit
spread that is on average ﬁfteen basis points lower compared to the AA minus
rating category. For the A rating category, the diﬀerence between the plus and
minus subcategory is even more pronounced. The credit spread on A minus rated
bonds is on average double the spread on A plus rated bonds. For the BBB rated
bonds, there is a diﬀerence of ﬁfty basis points between on the one hand the plus
rating and on the other hand the ﬂat and the minus rating. Even tough we only
make a distinction between two subrating categories instead of three, there are not
as much bonds in each subrating category compared to the AA and the A rating
c a t e g o r y .T h ed i s a d v a n t a g eo fh a v i n go n l yf ew bonds in a subrating category is that
one or two outliers can drive the results. This explains why ﬂat and minus BBB
rated bonds have a spread that is on average ﬁfty basis points higher. Therefore,
in the remainder of the paper, we will concentrate on the weighted average of the
BBB credit spreads. For AA and A, we will distinguish between plus, ﬂat and minus
subrating categories. For AAA and AA rated bonds, credit spreads on bonds with
2 years to maturity have a credit spread that is on average a few basis points higher
compared to bonds with 3 years to maturity. A possible explanation is that bonds
with 2 years to maturity pay a higher liquidity premium and thus have a higher
spread.
Besides rating categories, we also make a distinction between three sectors: ﬁ-
nancial, industrial and utility. Panel B of Table 1 shows that AAA and AA rated
bonds are mainly ﬁnancials whereas BBB rated bonds are mainly industrials. The
group of A rated bonds is the only category for which there is an equal mixture of
ﬁnancials and industrials and thus we are able to estimate a separate term struc-
ture12. The term structure of credit spreads for industrial bonds is on average higher
compared to ﬁnancials (the results are not shown). Panel B of Table 2, however,
shows that more than 85% of the A ﬁnancials are rated plus or ﬂat whereas 77% of
A rated industrials are rated ﬂat or minus. It is very likely that industrials have a
higher credit spread simply because they mainly consist of lower rated bonds com-
pared to ﬁnancials. Therefore, in what follows, we will only concentrate on diﬀerent
ratings and their subcategories instead of sectors.
4.2.3 Measures of Fit
Graph 8 presents the average yield errors (AAEyield) for AAA, AA, A and BBB
rated bonds using the NS model (solid lines) and the extended NS model (dotted
lines). The results indicate that the AAEyield for all rating categories are lower if
the extended model is used to estimate the term structure of spot rates. Up till
the ﬁrst half of 2000, yield errors are similar across rating categories (except BBB).
From October 2000, yield errors as well as credit spreads in all rating categories start
to diverge. It seems that periods of higher credit spreads coincides with periods of
higher volatility of yields. Table 5 present the average and standard deviation of
the yield errors and the results of the t-test (p-values are given between brackets).
12Utilities are not analyzed separately because we do not have enough bonds.
16The null hypothesis of equal yield errors of the NS and the extended NS model
is rejected at 5% level for all rating categories. Panel B shows that, except for
AA, yield errors are on average higher for bonds with a short to medium term to
maturity compared to bonds with a long time to maturity. Although the diﬀerence
between yield errors is small, it seems more diﬃcult to estimate the term structure
at the longer maturity end. Panel C presents the hit ratio, i.e. the percentage of
bonds that have an observed yield to maturity outside a 95% conﬁdence interval
around the estimated term structure of yields to maturity. The results show that
between 2% and 3% of the bonds have a yield outside a 95% conﬁdence interval if
we use the NS model. Using the extended NS model results in much lower hit ratios,
between 0.5% and 1.3%. For AA, A and BBB rated bonds, most yields outside the
conﬁdence interval are above the interval.
The third measure of ﬁt is the transition matrix of the ﬁtted yield errors (6).
For each rating category, ﬁtted yield errors of the NS model (panel A) and extended
NS model (panel B) are classiﬁed in three groups: negative, zero or positive. Col-
umn 3 of Table 6 gives the percentage of ﬁtted yield errors in a certain category
(unconditional frequency). Columns 4 to 6 present the percentage of ﬁtted yield
errors in a category at time t conditional on the category at time t+1 (conditional
frequency). If errors are random, the classiﬁcation at time t should have no eﬀect
on the classiﬁcation at time t +1 . This means that the unconditional and condi-
tional frequency of being positive should be similar. Table 6, however, shows that
the probability of being positive at time t + 1 if the yield errors is positive at time
t is above 50% for all rating categories. Although the diﬀerence is very small, the
persistence of the yield errors is smaller for the extended NS model. Furthermore,
for AAA rated bonds there is a higher probability that the yield errors fall within
the interval between the bid and the ask yield, 29% for AAA rated bond compared
to 7% for BBB rated bonds. If we use the extended NS model even more AAA
rated bonds have yield errors within the bid-ask spread (33% compared to 9%).
Finally, we test the out-of-sample forecasting performance of both the NS and
t h ee x t e n d e dN Sm o d e l . W ee s t i m a t eo n e -week, two-week and one-month ahead
forecasts of the yields. Table 7 presents the AAEyield of the original model and
t h ef o r e c a s t s ,f o rb o t ht h eN Sa n dt h ee x t e n d e dN Sm o d e l .T h eAAEyield of a one
month ahead forecast of AAA and AA rated bonds are more than double the in
sample AAEyield of the original (extended) NS model. A one week ahead forecast
results in yield errors that are only slightly higher than the original model. The
forecast yield errors resulting from the extended NS model are always smaller than
those from the NS model.
4.3 Determinants of credit spread changes
4.3.1 Model
For the regression analysis, we use credit spreads on AAA, AA, A and BBB rated
bonds with 2 to 10 years to maturity. Credit spreads on AA, A and BBB rated bonds
are a weighted average of the credit spreads on subrating categories within each
rating (plus, ﬂat and minus). The weights are the number of bonds in each subrating
17category in percentage of the total number of bonds in that rating category. Beyond
10 years to maturity there are not enough bonds to estimate the term structure
properly (see Table 1). For the same reason, we do not include credit spreads of
BBB rated bonds with 2 years to maturity. The underlying data covers the period
January 1998 until December 2002. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the
level of the dependent variable in the regression analysis. In order to analyze the
main determinants of credit spread changes of a rating category j,w i t hj = {AAA,
AA plus, AA ﬂat, AA minus, A plus, A ﬂat, A minus and BBB},w ee s t i m a t et h e
following equation
4CRt,j = βo + β4i3 4i3,t + β4slope 4islope,t + βmRm
t−1,j + β4IV 4IVt
+β4Liq 4Liqt,j + βlag 4CRt−1,j + νt,j, with νt,j˜N
¡
0,σ2¢ (5)
where β =( βo,βm,β4i3,t,β4slope,β4IV,β4Liq,βlag) is the vectors of parameters.
4i3 and islope are the changes of the level and the slope of the default-free term
structure. As in Duﬀee (1998), we deﬁne the slope as the spread between the
10-year constant maturity EMU government bond yield minus the 3 month euro
rate. The level is deﬁned as the 3 month euro rate. Rm
j is a weighted average of
the return on the DJ Euro Stoxx Financials and the DJ Euro Stoxx Industrials.
The weights are the number of bonds in rating category j that are issued in the
ﬁnancial sector, respectively industrial sector, in percentage of the total number of
ﬁnancial and industrial bonds in rating category j. For the AAA rating category for
example Rm
AAA will almost coincide with the return on the DJ Euro Stoxx Financials
whereas for the BBB rating category Rm
BBB is mainly driven by the return on the DJ
Euro Stoxx Industrials. 4IV is the change in the implied volatility on the DJ Euro
Stoxx. The implied volatility is the average of the put and the call implied volatility.
4Liqt,j is the change in the average bid-ask spread of the bonds included in the
analysis at time t and t + 1 in rating category j. Weekly data of the explanatory
variables are obtained from Datastream and Bloomberg.
4.3.2 Results
Table 8 presents the regression results for diﬀerent rating categories, AAA, AA, A
and BBB, and for diﬀerent years to maturity ranging from 2 to 10 years. For the
AA and A rating, we make a distinction between three subrating categories, namely
plus, ﬂat and minus rating. The reason is that we ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in
credit spreads between subrating categories. For AAA rating, there are no subrat-
ing categories and for BBB rating we do not make a distinction between subrating
categories. Since there are only few BBB rated bonds in the subrating categories,
we concentrate on the total BBB rating category. Furthermore, the regression re-
sults for BBB bonds are not directly comparable with the other results since the
analysis of the former covers a shorter period (June 2000-December 2002). We test
the residuals of each regression for serial correlation with the Breusch-Godfrey test.
The null hypothesis of the LM test is that there is no serial correlation up to lag
18order p, where p is a pre-speciﬁed integer. The LM test statistic is asymptotically
distributed as a χ2(p).13 Furthermore, we test the residuals for heteroskedasticity
using the White heteroskedasticity test. The null hypothesis is that of no het-
eroskedasticity against heteroskedasticity of some unknown general form. Whites
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to
the number of slope coeﬃcients (excluding the constant) in the test regression.14
Because most of the results reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and/or
no autocorrelation, we report Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors.
Our ﬁrst observation is that changes in the level (4i3)a n dt h es l o p e( 4islope)o f
t h ed e f a u l t - f r e et e r ms t r u c t u r ea r et w oi m p o r t a n td e t e r m i n a n t so fc r e d i ts p r e a d
changes. As in Longstaﬀ & Schwartz (1995) and Duﬀee (1998) and in accordance
with the Merton type of models, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between changes in
the level and the slope and credit spread changes. While the slope eﬀect is signiﬁcant
for all (sub)rating categories and for most maturity ranges, the level eﬀect is mainly
signiﬁcant for the higher rating categories, namely AAA and AA rated bonds, with
am a t u r i t yu pt o7y e a r s .F o rb o n d sw i t hal o n gt e r mt om a t u r i t yc h a n g e si nt h e
level of the default-free term structure do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The slope
eﬀect appears to be hump shaped, i.e. the eﬀect ﬁrst increases with the time to
maturity with a maximum around ﬁve or six years and then decreases with the time
to maturity. It seems that on average the eﬀect of the level and the slope do not
depend on the (sub)rating category.






expected negative sign. If we include Rm
t−1, we ﬁnd that in 57 of the 70 regressions
the coeﬃcient βm is signiﬁc a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e lw h e r e a si fw ei n c l u d et h ec u r r e n t
market return (Rm
t )t h ec o e ﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in only 10 of the
70 regressions. This is in accordance with the results of Kwan (1996) who ﬁnds
that stocks lead bonds in ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Lagged stock returns have
explanatory power for current credit spread changes. For all (sub)rating categories
the eﬀect becomes stronger the longer the maturity of the bonds. For bonds with 10
years to maturity the eﬀect on credit spread changes is almost double the eﬀect on
bonds with 2 years to maturity. Furthermore, the eﬀect depends on the (sub)rating
category. AA rated bonds are more aﬀected by the lagged market return compared
to AAA rated bonds, A rated bonds more than AA rated bonds and BBB rated
bonds more than A rated bonds. Even within the AA and A rating category, the
eﬀect depends on the subrating. Minus rated bonds are more aﬀected than minus
rated bonds.
Changes in the implied volatility of the DJ Euro Stoxx (4IV) have the expected
positive sign, which is in accordance with the ﬁndings of Campbell & Taksler (2002).
13The advantage of the Breusch-Godfrey test is that the original regression may include AR and
MA terms, in which case the test regression will be modiﬁed to take account of the ARMA terms.
14White also describes this approach as a general test for model misspeciﬁcation, since the null
hypothesis underlying the test assumes that the errors are both homoskedastic and independent
of the regressors, and that the linear speciﬁcation of the model is correct. Failure of any one of
these conditions could lead to a signiﬁcant test statistic. Conversely, a non-signiﬁcant test statistic
implies that none of the three conditions is violated.
19An increase in the implied volatility increases the probability of default and hence
causes a widening of credit spreads. In the majority of cases, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The eﬀect increases the longer the maturity of the bond. Further-
more, the eﬀect is higher for lower rated bonds. Even within the AA and A rating
category, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is stronger for minus rated bonds compared to plus
rated bonds.
As in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Houweling et al. (2002), diﬀerences in
liquidity aﬀect corporate yield spreads. Changes in our measure of liquidity (4Liq)
- the average bid-ask spread - are signiﬁcantly positively related to credit spread
changes of BBB rated and AA plus rated bonds and A ﬂat rated bonds. The eﬀect
strongly depends on the rating category. The coeﬃcients for BBB rated bonds are
more than double the coeﬃcients for the A ﬂat rated bonds while the latter are
more than double the coeﬃcients of the AA plus rated bonds. For the BBB rating
category, the eﬀect strongly increases with the time to maturity. BBB rated bonds
with 10 years to maturity are much more aﬀected than BBB rated bonds with 2
years to maturity.
Lagged Credit spreads changes (one period) have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on AAA
and AA rated bonds with a short to medium term to maturity. An increase in
credit spread changes at time t causes a decrease of credit spread changes at time
t + 1. Bonds with a short time to maturity are more aﬀected by lagged changes
compared to bonds with a medium time to maturity.
Although none of the constant terms (βo0s)a r es i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level, those
of the AAA, AA and A rating category appear to be a function of the time to
maturity and the rating category. The longer the time to maturity and the lower
the rating category the higher the constant term. Even within the AA and A rating
category, the constant is higher for minus compared to plus rated bonds. The
constant terms for the BBB rating are not in line with the other rating categories.
The reason might be that the analysis for BBB rated bonds covers a much shorter
period.
Finally, the adjusted R2 (last row of each panel) shows that between 1% and
32% of credit spread changes can be explained by the included variables, depending
on the rating and time to maturity. For BBB rated bonds the adjusted R2 is much
higher compared to the other rating categories.
4.3.3 Robustness
So far, the level and the slope of the default-free term structure are proxied by
the three-month euro rate and the diﬀerence between the 10-year EMU government
bond yield and the three-month euro rate. In the NS model, however, the β0 + β1
and the −β1 (see equation 4) are assumed to be the level and the slope of the
default-free term structure. These parameters are estimated on a weekly basis for a
sample of 250 AAA rated government bonds. To check the robustness of our results,
we reestimate the regression model (5) and include changes in β0 + β1 and −β1 to
proxy for changes in the level and the slope of the default-free term structure.
The correlation between β0 + β1 and the three month euro rate is 0.8 while the
20correlation between −β1 and the diﬀerence between the 10-year EMU government
bond yield and the three-month euro rate is 0.7. Although the adjusted R2 slightly
decreases, the results (not show here) are similar to the previous results. Changes
in the level and the slope of the default-free have the expected negative sign. Both
eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for bonds with a maturity up to 7 years. For
long term bonds the level and the slope eﬀect is not signiﬁcant anymore. Including
the β0+β1 and the −β1 slightly increases the coeﬃcients and the signiﬁcance of the
stock return and the changes in the volatility of the stock return. The coeﬃcients
and the p-values of the changes in the bid-ask spread and the lagged dependent
variable are not altered.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we examine the term structure of credit spreads on euro corporate
bonds and the empirical validation of structural credit risk models. Although the
pricing of corporate bonds and the theoretical models of credit risk cover a broad
literature, there has been little empirical testing on structural credit risk models. We
use a dataset of 1577 investment grade corporate and 250 AAA rated government
bonds included in the Merrill Lynch Broad EMU Market indices. We model the
term structure of credit spreads for homogenous risk classes -(sub)rating categories-
by using an extension of the Nelson-Siegel model. The extension includes four
additional factors that should capture diﬀerences in liquidity, taxation and subrating
categories. Then, we analyze the changes in the term structure of credit spreads
for AAA, AA, A and BBB rated bonds. For AA and A, we make a distinction
between the plus, ﬂat and minus subrating category. The structural or ﬁrm-value
models provide a framework to determine the main factors included in the analysis:
changes of the level and the slope of the default-free term structure, the stock return,
changes of the implied volatility of the stock return. Although the assumptions of
perfect and complete markets made in the structural models imply no diﬀerences in
liquidity, empirical ﬁndings suggest that it might be an important factor. Therefore,
we include a measure of (il)liquidity -the bid-ask spread. Finally, we include a lagged
dependent variable. The econometric analysis of credit spread changes shows that
the changes in the level and the slope of the default-free term structure are two
important determinants. While changes in the slope aﬀect all rating categories,
changes in the level mainly aﬀect the higher rating categories, namely AAA and
AA rated bonds. The stock return and the implied volatility of the stock price seem
to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence credit spread changes. The lower the rating category and
the longer the maturity of the bond the stronger both eﬀects. Our results are in line
with those reported by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) that on average one quarter of
the credit spread changes are explained by the variables suggested by the structural
models. For BBB rated bonds, changes in the bid-ask spread signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
credit spread changes. Higher rated bonds (AAA and AA) are also driven by past
credit spread changes.
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Graph 8: Comparison between Average Absolute Yield Errors between
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28Table 1: Average Number of Bonds in Diﬀerent Rating categories, Sectors and
Maturity Ranges
Panel A: Average number of bonds based on rating and maturity
AAA AA A BBB
Total 193 [18] 259 [20] 236 [103] 115 [53]
1-3 years 65 [9] 72 [7] 50 [23] 24 [21]
3-5 years 52 [6] 67 [11] 63 [30] 42 [21]
5-7 years 30 [5] 40 [11] 45 [22] 32 [7]
7-10 years 32 [4] 67 [14] 69 [32] 17 [5]
+10 years 15 [4] 14 [3] 8 [3] -
Panel B: Average number of bonds based on rating and sector
AAA AA A BBB
Total 235 [9] 318 [28] 265 [112] 131 [63]
Finanacials 225 [10] 258 [17] 142 [47] 8 [7]
Industrials 4 [1] 32 [9] 103 [53] 111 [51]
Utilities 1 [2] 19 [5] 16 [13] 8 [3]
Panel C: Average percentage of bonds based on rating and sector
AAA AA A BBB
Finanacials 96% 81% 54% 6%
Industrials 2% 10% 39% 84%
Utilities 1% 6% 6% 6%
Note: This table presents the average number of bonds based on rating and time to maturity
(Panel A) and rating and sector (Panel B). Standard deviations are given between brackets. The
average percentage of bonds based on rating and sector are presented in Panel C. The data set
consists of weekly data from Jan. 1 1998 until Dec. 31, 30 2002 ∗For BBB, the data starts from
Jun. 2000.
29T a b l e2 :S u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c so ft h et i m et om a t u r i t ya n dt h en u m b e ro fw e e k s
Panel A: Summary statistics of years to maturity and number of weeks
Mean Stdev Min Max
Years to Maturity
AAA 4.94 3.16 1.00 19.91
AA 5.28 2.96 1.00 14.98
A 5.59 2.79 1.00 21.89
BBB 5.07 1.97 1.00 10.19
Number of weeks
Total 145 75
Panel B: % of bonds in subrating categories and sectors
subrating categories
plus ﬂat minus
AA 24.6% 33.2% 42.2%
A 39.9% 33.9% 26.2%
BBB 54.5% 34.1% 11.4%
A ﬁnancials 52.0% 34.5% 13.5%
A industrials 23.4% 37.7% 38.9%
Panel C:
Initial rating AAA AA A BBB NA
AAA 202 98.2 1.6 0.2 0 0.1
AA 279 0.3 88.9 10.2 0 0.6
A 214 1.3 2.8 89.9 4.5 1.6
BBB∗ 90 0 0 8.3 86.5 5.3
Note: Panel A presents the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum) of the time to maturity and the number of weeks that a bond is included in the index
between Jan. 1998 and Dec. 2002. Panel B presents the percentage of bonds in each rating
category (AA, A, BBB, A ﬁnancials and A industrials) that have a plus, ﬂat or minus rating.
Panel C presents the probability that a bond has the same rating or has been up- or downgraded
after one year. This table presents the average of ﬁve yearly transition matrices. ∗For BBB rated
bonds, the analysis covers the period Jan. 2000 until Dec. 2002.
30Table 3: The eﬀect of subratings, liquidity and diﬀerences in coupon rates on yield
errors within rating categories
Panel A: Yield errors within subsamples of rating categories
AA A BBB
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Subratings plus 0.07 [0.04] 0.12 [0.08] 0.25 [0.13]
minus -0.04 [0.02] -0.12 [0.09] -0.57 [0.40]
Coupon high -0.04 [0.02] -0.02 [0.02] -0.04 [0.04]
low 0.03 [0.01] 0.02 [0.02] 0.06 [0.06]
Liquidity high -0.01 [0.01] -0.03 [0.04] -0.14 [0.16]
low 0.01 [0.01] 0.01 [0.02] 0.14 [0.16]
Panel B: Test for equality of mean
AA A BBB
Value Prob Value Prob Value Prob
Subratings 40.8 [0.00] 32.6 [0.00] 22.6 [0.00]
Coupon 57.7 [0.00] 16.5 [0.00] 15.6 [0.00]
Liquidity 25.1 [0.00] 14.8 [0.00] 13.8 [0.00]
P a n e lC :R e g r e s s i o nr e s u l t s :%s i g n ﬁcant at 5% level
AAA AA A BBB
Plus rating 29.2% 82.7% 80.6%
Minus rating 57.7% 39.6% 35.1%
Coupon 94.2% 69.6% 32.7% 33.6%
Liquidity 40% 43.5% 23.5% 49.3%
Note: Within each rating category the sample is split into (1) plus and minus-rated bonds, (2)
high and low coupon bonds and (3) liquid and less liquid bonds. Panel A presents the average
and the standard deviation of the yield errors within subsamples of each rating category. Panel
B presents the t-test for equality of the means.
31Table 4: Average Credit Spreads for Diﬀerent Ratings and Time to Maturity
Years to maturity
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
AAA 20.8 17.0 16.9 18.3 20.2 22.0 23.6 24.9 26.0
[2.6] [3.4] [5.2] [6.7] [8.0] [9.0] [9.8] [10.4] [11.0]
AA+ 23.3 22.6 24.4 27.2 30.1 32.8 35.1 37.1 38.6
[4.1] [4.3] [5.9] [7.7] [9.2] [10.2] [10.9] [11.4] [11.6]
AA 27.7 27.0 28.8 31.6 34.5 37.2 39.5 41.5 43.0
[3.6] [4.8] [6.8] [8.6] [10.1] [11.3] [12.1] [12.6] [12.9]
AA- 37.8 37.1 38.9 41.7 44.6 47.3 49.6 51.6 53.1
[5.9] [8.5] [10.6] [12.4] [13.8] [14.9] [15.7] [16.2] [16.6]
A+ 38.1 41.6 46.2 50.9 55.2 59.0 62.3 65.1 67.5
[6.3] [9.9] [12.9] [15.1] [16.8] [18.1] [19.0] [19.8] [20.4]
A+ 53.9 57.4 62.1 66.8 71.1 74.9 78.1 81.0 83.4
[12.4] [17.6] [20.7] [22.8] [24.3] [25.4] [26.2] [26.9] [27.4]
A- 77.1 80.6 85.2 89.9 94.2 98.0 101.3 104.1 106.5
[26.9] [32.0] [34.9] [36.7] [38.0] [38.8] [39.5] [40.0] [40.5]
BBB+ 102.7 104.1 109.9 117.8 126.6 135.7 144.8 153.9 162.9
[24.1] [27.0] [30.1] [31.2] [31.0] [30.4] [29.8] [29.9] [31.1]
BBB and 152.8 154.2 160.1 167.9 176.7 185.8 195.0 204.1 213.0
BBB- [33.9] [38.6] [42.0] [43.1] [42.9] [42.2] [41.6] [41.3] [41.9]
Note: This table presents the averages and the standard deviations (between brackets) of credit
spreads for diﬀerent (sub)rating categories and time to maturity.
32Table 5: Average Absolute Yield Errors
Panel A: Average absolute errors: NS versus extended NS model
t-test
mean stdev value prob
AAA 8.9 2.4 3.93 0.00
AAA (ext model) 8.0 2.3
AA 11.1 1.7 4.38 0.00
AA (ext. model) 10.5 1.5
A 18.0 8.7 2.72 0.01
A (ext. model) 16.1 7.8
BBB 51.8 27.2 2.1 0.04
BBB (ext. model) 45.0 25.2
Panel B: Average absolut errors of the extended NS model
AAA AA A BBB
≤ 2 years 8.1 9.8 16.2 67.1
≤ 3 years 8.8 9.9 17.0 45.2
≤ 4 years 9.1 10.3 15.5 49.5
≤ 5 years 9.6 9.4 15.4 45.8
≤ 6 years 7.4 10.1 16.6 38.4
≤ 7 years 6.5 11.8 17.4 38.8
≤ 8 years 5.9 13.8 15.1 54.3
≤ 9 years 7.8 11.0 15.1 47.2
≤ 10 years 5.9 10.3 15.5 33.1
> 10 years 5.5 10.5 13.7 -
Panel C: % of yield outside a 95% conﬁdence interval (hit ratio)
AAA AA A BBB
NS model 2.36 2.12 2.85 2.87
above 0.88 1.49 2.62 2.52
below 1.47 0.63 0.23 0.26
Extended NS model 1.22 1.04 0.98 0.56
above 0.50 0.61 0.86 0.56
below 0.72 0.44 0.13 0.00
Note: Panel A presents the average absolute yield errors (AAEyield) and the standard deviations
of the NS and the extended NS model. The results of the t-test of equality of means are presented
in column 3 and 4. Panel B presents the AAEyield for diﬀerent maturity ranges. Panel C presents
the percentage of bonds that have a yield outside (above and/or below) a 95% conﬁdence interval
around the estimated term structure.
33Table 6: Transition Matrices for the Fitted Yield Errors
Panel A: Results of the orignal NS model
Unconditional Conditional Frequency (εt+1|εt)
Frecuency (εt) εt+1 < 0 εt+1 =0 εt+1 > 0
AAA εt < 0 33.7 87.0 5.4 7.6
εt = 0 29.2 5.9 85.0 9.1
εt > 0 37.1 7.1 7.0 85.9
AA εt < 0 43.9 89.8 4.4 5.8
εt = 0 24.2 7.7 86.6 5.7
εt > 0 31.9 7.7 4.4 87.9
A εt < 0 50.4 93.9 2.6 3.5
εt = 0 13.7 10.3 81.5 8.2
εt > 0 36.0 4.6 3.3 92.1
BBB εt < 0 60.3 96.7 2.1 1.2
εt = 0 7.1 20.7 64.2 15.1
εt > 0 32.5 2.0 3.7 94.4
Panel B: Results of the extended NS model
Unconditional Conditional frequency (εt+1|εt)
Frecuency (εt) εt+1 < 0 εt+1 =0 εt+1 > 0
AAA εt < 0 31.6 85.6 6.0 8.3
εt = 0 32.6 5.8 86.0 8.2
εt > 0 35.8 7.5 7.7 84.8
AA εt < 0 41.3 89.2 5.1 5.7
εt = 0 26.0 7.9 86.0 6.1
εt > 0 32.7 7.1 5.1 87.8
A εt < 0 51.7 93.0 3.2 3.8
εt = 0 15.1 11.1 78.9 9.9
εt > 0 33.2 5.7 4.6 89.6
BBB εt < 0 54.0 92.8 3.4 3.8
εt = 0 9.3 24.1 54.9 21.0
εt > 0 36.6 5.1 6.0 88.8
Note: The underlying data are the ﬁtted yield errors from the Nelson-Siegel model (panel A) and
the extended NS model (panel B). For each rating category, ﬁtted yield errors are classiﬁed in
three groups (pos., zero, neg.) at time t and t+1. The percentages of yield errors in a certain
category (unconditional frequency) are presented in column 3. The percentages of yield errors
in a category at time t+1 conditional on the classiﬁcation at time t (conditional frequency) are
presented in column 4 to 6 in panel B.
34Table 7: Forecasting Performance of the NS and the extended NS model
P a n e lA :N Sm o d e l
Original Forecasts
1 week ahead 2 weeks ahead 1 month ahead
AAA 8.8 11.8 14.4 18.8
2.4 4.5 6.5 9.7
AA 11.0 13.7 16.0 20.0
1.7 3.9 5.7 8.8
A 18.2 20.0 21.8 24.7
8.7 9.0 9.4 10.7
BBB 52.7 53.3 53.9 55.2
27.1 27.1 27.1 27.3
Panel B: Extended NS model
Original Forecasts
1 week ahead 2 weeks ahead 1 month ahead
AAA 8.0 11.1 13.8 18.2
2.3 4.6 6.6 9.8
AA 10.4 13.1 15.5 19.5
1.5 3.9 5.8 9.0
A 16.2 18.2 20.1 23.2
7.8 8.2 8.7 10.4
BBB 45.0 47.1 48.1 50.0
25.2 25.1 25.2 25.4
Note: This table presents the average absolute yield errors of (1) the original model, (2) one-week
ahead forecasts, (3) two weeks ahead forecasts and (4) one month ahead forecasts of the spot rates.
35Table 8: Regression results for diﬀerent (sub)rating categories of bonds with a
maturity ranging from 2 to 10 years
4CRt,j = βo + β4i3 4i3,t + β4slope 4islope,t + βmRm
t−1,j + β4IV 4IVt
+β4Liq 4Liqt,j + βlag 4CRt−1,j + νt,j
CR is the credit spread, i3 and islope a r et h el e v e la n dt h es l o p eo ft h ed e f a u l t - f r e et e r ms t r u c t u r e ,
Rm is a weighted average of the DJ Euro Stoxx ﬁnancials and industrials, IV is the implied
volatility on the DJ Euro Stoxx and Liq is the average bid-ask spread. j stands for (sub)rating
category. Finally, the model also includes a lagged dependent variable. Newey-West standard
errors are given between brackets.
P a n e lA :A A Ar a t e db o n d s
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
[0.69] [0.91] [1.00] [0.95] [0.91] [0.86] [0.79] [0.73] [0.69]
βMi3 -3.24 -5.85 -6.95 -6.97 -6.22 -4.97 -3.38 -1.56 0.38
[0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.40] [0.85]
βMslope -4.00 -7.12 -8.83 -9.26 -8.79 -7.86 -6.72 -5.52 -4.30
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βm -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12
[0.03] [0.07] [0.04] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11
[0.08] [0.45] [0.48] [0.27] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.06 -0.04 -0.13
[0.24] [0.41] [0.35] [0.30] [0.34] [0.54] [0.85] [0.91] [0.76]
βlag -0.39 -0.30 -0.20 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.39] [0.62] [0.50] [0.22] [0.05]
R
2
21.3% 23.9% 27.7% 29.1% 27.3% 23.6% 19.3% 15.6% 13.1%
Panel B: AA plus rating category
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
[0.86] [0.84] [0.64] [0.55] [0.52] [0.53] [0.55] [0.58] [0.63]
βMi3 -6.10 -7.01 -6.47 -5.49 -4.44 -3.43 -2.47 -1.55 -0.65
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.11] [0.25] [0.49] [0.78]
βMslope -5.67 -6.51 -7.16 -7.26 -6.88 -6.20 -5.36 -4.47 -3.55
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
βm -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20
[0.13] [0.05] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
[0.04] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq -0.05 0.04 0.19 0.31 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40
[0.82] [0.83] [0.35] [0.15] [0.07] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05]
βlag -0.38 -0.35 -0.26 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.15] [0.44] [0.62] [0.50] [0.25]
R
2
24.5% 27.7% 29.3% 30.8% 31.1% 29.8% 26.9% 22.6% 18.1%
Note: Panel A and B present the regression results for the AAA and AA plus (sub)rating
categories. The analysis covers the period January 1998 until December 2002.
36P a n e lC :A Aﬂat rating category
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
[0.89] [0.82] [0.63] [0.54] [0.51] [0.52] [0.53] [0.56] [0.60]
βMi3 -6.64 -7.26 -6.34 -5.03 -3.77 -2.67 -1.71 -0.87 -0.08
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.27] [0.61] [0.97]
βMslope -5.69 -6.50 -6.99 -6.90 -6.36 -5.57 -4.70 -3.84 -3.01
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
βm -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19
[0.22] [0.11] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11
[0.12] [0.11] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq 0.21 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09
[0.56] [0.33] [0.26] [0.30] [0.47] [0.71] [0.88] [0.89] [0.77]
βlag -0.38 -0.33 -0.23 -0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.75] [0.53] [0.30] [0.53] [0.76]
R
2
22.8% 23.8% 23.7% 24.7% 25.7% 25.6% 23.5% 19.2% 14.5%
P a n e lD :A Am i n u sr a t i n gc a t e g o r y
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
[0.90] [0.69] [0.55] [0.46] [0.42] [0.41] [0.41] [0.43] [0.46]
βMi3 -5.90 -6.64 -5.77 -4.50 -3.24 -2.10 -1.07 -0.15 0.69
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.12] [0.32] [0.63] [0.95] [0.80]
βMslope -5.05 -5.86 -6.38 -6.39 -5.97 -5.28 -4.43 -3.52 -2.58
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.12]
βm -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21
[0.13] [0.06] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
[0.13] [0.16] [0.06] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
βMliq 0.12 0.17 -0.02 -0.24 -0.42 -0.54 -0.59 -0.60 -0.57
[0.83] [0.78] [0.97] [0.63] [0.38] [0.27] [0.24] [0.26] [0.33]
βlag -0.34 -0.31 -0.24 -0.17 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.24] [0.37] [0.36] [0.22]
R
2
16.1% 16.0% 15.0% 14.8% 14.8% 14.5% 13.6% 12.2% 10.6%
Note: This table presents the regression results for the AA ﬂat and AA minus subrating categories.
The dependent variables are the credit spread changes on AA ﬂat rated bonds (panel C) and AA
minus rated bonds (panel D). The analysis covers the period January 1998 until December 2002.
37Panel E: A plus rated bonds
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20
[0.74] [0.43] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] [0.35] [0.34] [0.35]
βMi3 -3.12 -4.12 -5.36 -5.61 -5.13 -4.16 -2.89 -1.55 -0.36
[0.25] [0.20] [0.12] [0.11] [0.14] [0.22] [0.38] [0.63] [0.92]
βMslope -2.20 -4.24 -6.90 -8.32 -8.47 -7.77 -6.59 -5.25 -3.89
[0.33] [0.12] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.04] [0.14]
βm -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.26 -0.31
[0.01] [0.04] [0.08] [0.09] [0.06] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq 0.61 -0.68 -1.32 -1.48 -1.37 -1.14 -0.88 -0.60 -0.27
[0.35] [0.32] [0.10] [0.08] [0.10] [0.16] [0.26] [0.45] [0.76]
βlag -0.07 -0.18 -0.21 -0.17 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09
[0.26] [0.06] [0.01] [0.04] [0.17] [0.48] [0.76] [0.70] [0.25]
R
2
5.1% 10.3% 14.3% 14.1% 13.1% 13.1% 14.4% 15.7% 15.7%
Panel F: A ﬂat rated bonds
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.20
[0.76] [0.67] [0.63] [0.60] [0.57] [0.53] [0.48] [0.43] [0.40]
βMi3 -6.35 -7.12 -8.55 -9.07 -8.75 -7.84 -6.59 -5.19 -3.83
[0.19] [0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.11] [0.14] [0.21] [0.32] [0.46]
βMslope -4.07 -5.79 -8.27 -9.71 -9.99 -9.44 -8.40 -7.12 -5.75
[0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] [0.09]
βm -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.26 -0.31 -0.36
[0.02] [0.09] [0.13] [0.12] [0.06] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
[0.06] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq 0.67 1.06 1.52 1.77 1.83 1.73 1.51 1.24 0.95
[0.49] [0.30] [0.15] [0.09] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.11] [0.23]
βlag 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07
[0.97] [0.64] [0.38] [0.42] [0.59] [0.75] [0.82] [0.73] [0.43]
R
2
4.9% 6.5% 9.3% 11.1% 12.0% 12.8% 13.8% 14.4% 14.1%
Note: This table presents the regression results for the A plus and A ﬂat subrating categories.
The dependent variables are the credit spread changes on A plus rated bonds (panel E) and A
ﬂat rated bonds (panel F). The analysis covers the period January 1998 until December 2002.
38Panel G: A minus rated bonds
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.38
[0.41] [0.35] [0.33] [0.31] [0.30] [0.29] [0.27] [0.26] [0.26]
βMi3 -9.60 -10.6 -12.3 -12.8 -12.5 -11.5 -10.12 -8.64 -7.18
[0.12] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10] [0.12] [0.17] [0.23] [0.32]
βMslope -4.87 -6.68 -9.32 -10.9 -11.2 -10.6 -9.48 -8.03 -6.45
[0.18] [0.07] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] [0.11] [0.20]
βm -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.32 -0.35 -0.38 -0.42 -0.47
[0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMIV 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq -0.62 -0.41 -0.02 0.15 0.15 0.05 -0.13 -0.34 -0.56
[0.61] [0.73] [0.98] [0.89] [0.88] [0.96] [0.88] [0.69] [0.51]
βlag 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
[0.71] [0.81] [0.46] [0.43] [0.53] [0.68] [0.82] [0.89] [0.83]
R
2
8.1% 8.9% 10.4% 11.3% 11.6% 12.0% 12.7% 13.5% 13.7%
Panel H: BBB rated bonds
2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 1 0y
βo - 0.22 0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.19 -0.28 -0.37 -0.33
[0.67] [0.87] [0.96] [0.86] [0.78] [0.72] [0.69] [0.75]
βMi3 - -10.8 -17.2 -21.0 -23.0 -24.3 -25.5 -27.1 -27.2
[0.14] [0.01] [0.02] [0.06] [0.09] [0.13] [0.17] [0.24]
βMslope - -11.07 -13.9 -18.4 -23.3 -28.2 -32.9 -37.5 -42.4
[0.08] [0.05] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
βm - -0.74 -0.70 -0.72 -0.80 -0.91 -1.03 -1.15 -1.13
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
βMIV -0 . 2 6 0 . 2 8 0.40 0.58 0.78 1.01 1.23 1.45
[0.11] [0.10] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βMliq - 3.48 3.38 4.55 6.06 7.50 8.76 9.80 10.7
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
βlag - -0.05 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09
[0.63] [0.34] [0.41] [0.88] [0.65] [0.36] [0.20] [0.14]
R
2
- 14.7% 19.6% 24.2% 28.6% 32.4% 34.7% 35.2% 33.7%
Note: This table presents the regression results for the A minus and BBB rating category. The
dependent variables are the credit spread changes on A minus rated bonds (panel G) and BBB
rated bonds (panel H). The analysis covers the period January 1998 until December 2002. Due
to unavailability of enough BBB rated bonds from the start, Panel H starts from June 2000.
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